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Charters, Choice, and the Constitution
Myron Orfield and Thomas Lucet

INTRODUCTION

By the early 1990s, a strong market-based ideology had
taken over education reform circles in the United States.' Just
as it was argued that banks and derivative markets needed
freedom from regulation to innovate, so apparently did
America's schools. 2 In this heady time of a political third waythe notion that the best public policy was neither liberal nor
conservative-choice and competition were touted as the path to
improve American education, particularly for the least
fortunate. The argument was that the K-12 educational system,
the largest part of state and local budgets, constituted a noncompetitive monopoly supported by taxes that were so high that
they stunted growth and innovation. 3 Hence, competitive
t Myron Orfield is Professor of Law and Director of the Institute on Metropolitan
Opportunity, University of Minnesota. Thomas Luce is a Senior Fellow with the Institute
on Metropolitan Opportunity, University of Minnesota. The authors wish to also
acknowledge the contributions of Baris Gumus-Dawes and Eric Myott. Dr. GumusDawes made substantial contributions to IMO's first charter school study, which informs
parts of this paper. In particular, she contributed significantly to the section of the IMO
study contributing to Section V of this paper. Eric Myott is responsible for the maps and
some of the data collection supporting this work.
1 See generally John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics,Markets, and America's
Schools (Brookings 1990); Jeffrey R. Henig, Rethinking School Choice: The Limts of the
Market Metaphor (Princeton 1994); Diane Ravitch, Reign of Error: The Hoax of the

Privatization Movement and the Danger to America's Public Schools (Knopf 2013);
Herbert Gintis, et al, Book Review, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, 12 British J
L & Eq 381 (1991).
2

See generally Chubb and Moe, Politics,Markets, and America's Schools (cited in

note 1); Henig, Rethinking School Choice (cited in note 1); Ted Kolderie, Chartering
Diversity, 9 Eq & Choice 28 (1992).
See generally Kolderie, CharteringDiversity, 9 Equ & Choice 28 (cited in note 2);

Ted Kolderie, Beyond Choice to New Public Schools: Withdrawing the Exclusive
Franchise in Public Education (Progressive Policy Institute Nov 1990), online at
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED327914.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014); Ted Kolderie, What
Do We Mean by "Privatization"?, Society 50-51 (Sept/Dct 1987), online at
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/778/art%/ 253A10.10070%252FBF02695576.pdPau
th66=1413666270_304a2c70a52023b49005418f31942d23&ext=.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
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market-based education reforms promised more efficient schools,
lower taxes, and a stronger economy all in one go.4 When this
logic was combined with the argument that traditional
educational practices were responsible for the dismal outcomes
in the nation's economically and racially segregated urban
school systems, the momentum for change was overwhelming.
The lack of any concrete evidence that such ideas might work
did nothing to slow the speed with which they took hold.
Between 1954 and 1990, "choice-based" traditional
education strategies were struck down one by one by the United
States Supreme Court.5 Since 1990, a new wave of reformerscharter school and open enrollment advocates-have adopted
much of the same market-based rhetoric. Unfortunately, when
implemented without restraints, the new choice strategies also
share many of the same outcomes with the earlier "reforms"especially economic and racial segregation. Ironically, both
charter schools
and open enrollment "reforms" were
implemented first and with few restraints in Minnesota, a state
that had been a civil rights leader in earlier years. This Article
discusses the evolution of these school choice strategies and
their consequences.
I. THE BIRTH OF CHARTER SCHOOLS IN MINNESOTA
A.

An Early Civil Rights Leader

Minnesota was a national leader in the civil rights
movement and was perennially one of the states with the
highest achieving public schools. In early statehood, Minnesota's
abolitionist congressional leaders, along with those from New
England, urged President-elect Lincoln to brook no compromise
with the South on slavery in order to prevent secession.6 In
1869, its legislature was the second after the Civil War to
outlaw racial segregation in its public schools. 7

See generally Kolderie, Beyond Choice to New Public Schools (cited in note 3).
See Part II.
6
See generally Roman J. Zorn, Minnesota Public Opinion and the Secession
Controversy,December, 1860 April, 1861, 36 Miss V Hist Rev 435 (1949).
See Davison M. Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North: The Battle over Northern School
Segregation, 1865 1954 85 (Cambridge 2005). See generally William D. Green, A
Peculiar Imbalance: The Fall and Rise of Racial Equity in Early Minnesota (Minn Hist
Soc 2007).
4
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Clarence Mitchell, Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young-and
several other national African American civil rights leaderswere educated at the University of Minnesota and began their
civil rights careers pushing Minnesota to early national
leadership. 8 Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey signed the
nation's first fair housing and fair employment practices
ordinances and led the effort to include a strong civil rights
plank in the 1948 Democratic platform-a moment many see as
the beginning of the Democratic Party's post-war commitment to
civil rights legislation.9 Humphrey was a central actor in the
passage of the 1957, the 1960, and, most importantly, the 1964
Civil Rights Actso as a senator and in the Voting Rights Act"
and Fair Housing Act 1 2 as Vice President. Walter Mondale was
the chief Senate author of the 1968 Fair Housing Act and one of
the Senate's great "civil rights lions." 13
Minnesota Republicans from the Civil War through the
1980s were also civil rights champions. Governor Elmer L.
Anderson championed and signed the nation's first state human
rights law. 14 All of Minnesota's Republican congressional
representatives supported each of the civil rights bills passed
between 1950 and 1980. President Nixon's Supreme Court
appointees from Minnesota-Warren Burger and Harry
Blackman-angered him when they authored decisions that
created tools to dramatically increase school integration
throughout the United States. 15 While Burger would move to the
8

See generally Denton L. Watson, Lion in the Lobby: Clarence Mitchell, Jr.'s

Struggle for the Passage of Civil Rights Laws (Morrow 1990); Nancy J. Weiss, Whitney
M. Young, Jr., and the Struggles for Civil Rights (Princeton 1989); Roy Wilkins and Tom

Mathews, Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Roy Wilkins (Viking 1982).
9 See generally Carl Solberg, Hubert Humphrey: A Biography (Norton 1984);
Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate (Random House
2002).

10 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified at 42 USC § 2000
et seq.
" Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at
42 USC § 1971 et seq.
12 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-284,
82 Stat 81, codified as
amended at 42 USC § 36 et seq.
s See generally Walter F. Mondale and David Hage, The Good Fight: A Life in
Liberal Politics (Scribner 2010).
14 See generally
Elmer L. Anderson, A Man's Reach (Minnesota 2000) (L.
Sturdevant, ed).
" See generally Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the
Supreme Court (Simon and Schuster 1979). See also David S. Tatel, Judicial
Methodology, Southern School Desegregation and the Rule of Law, 79 NYU L Rev 1071,
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right, Harry Blackmun became one of the Court's dependable
proponents of school integration. 16 As recently as 1995, a
Republican Governor, Arne L. Carlson, signed a region-wide fair
housing measure for the Twin Cities. 17
In 1971, after a federal court declared the Minneapolis
schools de jure segregated, the legislature responded with
alacrity by authorizing a state administrative integration rule
that outlawed de facto segregation and tied state school aid to
integrated schools.18 The court strategically dissolved its
jurisdiction in reliance on this rule, but never declared the
district unitary,1 9 securing a clear legal basis to maintain
integration in perpetuity. 20
The state government on a bi-partisan basis created a
metropolitan level government and, without a court order,
implemented the nation's most effective pro-integrative fair
housing program, Metropolitan Council Policy 13/39 from 19711986.21 In 1991, there were virtually no non-white segregated
schools in the Twin Cities and Minnesota's public school system,
which, by virtue of its students' achievement levels, was among
the best in the nation.

1097 (2004).

16 See Paul Dimond, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation 58

(Michigan 1985). See generally Paul Dimond, Symposium Brown v. Board of Education

and Its Legacy: A Tribute to Thurgood Marshall: Panel II: Civil Rights and Education
After Brown: ConcludingRemarks, 61 Fordham L Rev 63 (1992).
17 See Myron Orfield, Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community
and
Stability 149-52 (Brookings 1997); Minn Stat § 473.25 et seq.
1s
See Minnesota Department of Education, Integrationof Racially Isolated School
Districts, Minn
Admin
Rule
3535.0170
(Sep
26,
2007),
online
at
https: //www.revisor.mn.gov/rules/?id=3535.0170 (visited Oct 18, 2014); Myron Orfield,

Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The Hope of the Minneapolis
DesegregationSettlement, 24 L & Ineq J 269, 318-19 (2006).
19 In Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent School

District No 89, Oklahoma County, Okla v Dowell, 498 US 237, 244-46 (1991), the
Supreme Court declared that a specific and clear finding of unitary status must be made
before the parties can assume that the court's injunction is terminated.
20 See Cheryl Heilman, Booker v Special School District No. 1: A History of School
Desegregationin Minneapolis,Minnesota, 12 L & Ineq J 127, 171-72 (1993).
21

See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated

Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 Fordham Urban L J 877, 919 (2006), citing Carrie

Daniel, Note, Land Use Planning The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council: Novel
Initiative,Futile Effort, 27 Wm Mitchell L Rev 1941, 1950-58 (2001).
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Education "Reform"

Yet, not all were happy in Lake Wobegon. Some affluent
families in Minneapolis did not like having their previous allwhite, affluent schools suddenly racially and socially integrated.
Some suburban leaders did not like affordable housing
requirements for their communities. Even more troubling were
Minnesota's very high income and commercial real estate taxes
compared to its neighbors in the Dakotas and Iowa. As local
businesses like Honeywell, Dayton-Hudson, Control Data,
Pillsbury, and General Mills grew, they made it clear they
wanted these taxes to decrease. The largest share of taxes was
going to support Minnesota's high-performing K-12 school
system. Without cutting school costs, it would be impossible to
cut taxes. Yet it was hard to fight the education monolith. When
successful businesses
and high net-worth
individuals
complained about educational waste, they did not gain much
traction with an education loving electorate.
However, at about this time, a new philosophy of reforms
championed by the business community and an important Twin
Cities policy organization-the Citizen's League-took hold. The
Citizen's League, a think-tank funded by the progressive Twin
Cities business establishment, began to campaign for marketoriented, choice-based approaches to public policy in the late
1960s when Ted Kolderie, a former newspaper reporter took
over as its Director. 22

22 Thomas Toch, Reflections on the Charter School Movement,
91 Washington View
70, 70 (2010) ("[I] learned about charter schools while strolling through a Minneapolis
suburb with Ted Kolderie, a civic gadfly."). See generally Ted Kolderie, Beyond BusinessEducation Partnerships, in Melissa A. Berman, Restructuring Education: Highlights
from a Conference (Conference Board 1987); David Osborne, Born on the Bayou: A New
Model
for
American Education (Third Way
Next
2012),
online
at
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/579/Third WayReport - Born on the BayouANew Model for American Education.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014). See, for example, Ted
Kolderie, Beyond System Reform: The Need for Greater Innovation in School and
Schooling (Education Week Mar 11, 2008), online at http://www.edweek.org/
ew/articles/2008/03/12/27kolderie.h27.html (visited Oct 18, 2014). See also Ted Kolderie,
Who We Are (Education Evolving 2014), online at http://www.educationevolving.org/bios/
ted-kolderie (visited Oct 18, 2014) (indicating that Kolderie works on system questions
and establishing Kolderie's previous work history as Executive Director of the Twin
Cities Citizens League, reporter and editorial writer for the Minneapolis Star and
Tribune, and as senior fellow at the University of Minnesota's Hubert H. Humphrey
Institute of Public Affairs. There is no indication that he has had an education-centric
background.).
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To these reformers it did not matter that Minnesota's
schools were among the nation's best. Minnesota schools should
not rest on their laurels because its competitors were not.
Competition would make Minnesota's schools be even better and
more efficient with public dollars. It was obvious that the state's
schools would benefit from the types of experiences that had
forged Minnesota's local business leaders into the smartest
people in the state. Moreover, the same competition would not
only improve education by fostering a race to the top, but it
would also accomplish racial and social integration of students
better than the public schools.
As the first fruits of the labors of the Citizen's League, in
1988, Minnesota passed an open enrollment law that allowed
students to attend any other public school they wanted, if it had
capacity. 2 3 In 1991, Minnesota passed the nation's first charter
school law. Minnesota recognized that education is a
fundamental
right
guaranteed
under
the
Minnesota
24
Constitution. Pursuant to this and other constitutional rights,
minority citizens sued the State of Minnesota in 1995 asserting
that newly emerging segregated schools in the Twin Cities
metropolitan area violated the Minnesota and federal
constitutions. In 2000, the state settled with these plaintiffs and
in so doing created a state-supported voluntary integration
program between Minneapolis and ten western suburban school
districts. 2 5 In this voluntary program, called the "Choice is
Yours," the state supported the transportation of predominantly
minority students from Minneapolis who chose to "open enroll"
from low-income, racially segregated neighborhoods into higher
opportunity, predominantly white schools in the suburbs. 26
Around this time, the state desegregation rule was gutted by
changes sought by educational reform proponents in 1999 that
exempted charters and open enrollment and in other ways
weakened its oversight.
23 See Open Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the
Twin Cities: 2000-2010 *4
(Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity Jan 2013), online at http://www.law.
umn.edu/uploads/30/c7/3Oc7dlfd89a6b132c81b36b37a79e9e1/Open-Enrollment-andRacial-Segregation-Final.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
24
See Skeen u State, 505 NW2d 299, 313 (Minn 1993).
25 See Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minnesota, Evaluation Report:
School District Integration Revenue 5 (2005), online at http://www.auditor.leg.
state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/integrevf.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
26
Orfield, 24 L & Ineq J at 314-18 (cited in note 18).
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CHOICE-BASED SEGREGATION TACTICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION

Choice and competition are central to a strong market
economy. However, even the most conservative of economists
acknowledge that unfettered markets are not always the best
way to provide goods or services, and that education is a prime
example where non-market, equity-based goals reduce the
effectiveness of market-based solutions. As an example, in the
not-too-distant past, educational "choice" programs were a
means by which whites avoided the integrated schools required
by Brown v Board of Education.27 Cases decided by the Supreme
Court during the post-Brown era reflect the various attempts
from states to avoid the new obligations regarding school
integration and help to shed light onto Minnesota's own
educational reform measures.
In the 1950s and 1960s-the time known as "massive
resistance"-Virginia went so far as to stop funding for
traditional public schools, creating school vouchers for use in
"segregation academies." 28 Later,
"freedom of choice"
desegregation plans in other states unconstitutionally placed the
burden of desegregation on the victims of discrimination and
their families, rather than on the discriminatory public actors.
Another strategy employed by white school boards to reduce the
political pressure for racial integration was to create all-black
specialty schools, staffed with all-black faculties, under the
control of the powerful black political leaders. Similarly, optional
transfer programs allowed whites to avoid integrated schools.
When choice programs allowed whites to leave integrated
districts for whiter suburban districts, this was an interdistrict
violation which would give rise to a city suburban busing
order. 29
347 US 483 (1954).
See generally Benjamin Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance (Indiana 1961). See
also Green u County School Board of New Kent County, 391 US 430, 441-42 (1968);
Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North at 172-186 (cited in note 7)
29 See, for example, Goss u Board of Educationof City
of Knoxuille, 373 US 683, 684
(1963) (finding unconstitutional the transfer provisions of the formal desegregation plan
of school board which allowed students to transfer upon request from such school, where
they would be in racial minority back to former segregated school where their race would
be in majority violated constitutional requirement of racially nondiscriminatory public
school system). See also Missouri u Jenkins, 515 US 70, 110-111 (1995) (O'Connor
concurring).
27
28
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There was only token integration of schools before the
passage of Title VI, the fund withholding provisions of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. 30 The three branches of government were
partners in progress, with the Court's role likely the most
important one. Brown led to Title VI. The Johnson
administration aggressively enforced Title VI. However, when
President Nixon refused to withhold funds from discriminatory
school districts, federal courts forced him to do so. 31 Moreover,
the Court in Green v County Board of New Kent, 32 Swann u
Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,33 Wright v Council
of the City of Emporia,34 and Keyes v School District No 135
sweepingly expanded the meaning of Brown and Title VI in the
face of hostile executive and legislative branches. 36
In many states of the former Confederacy, Brown v Board of
Education37 was met with "massive resistance." The state of
Virginia chose to close all its public schools and give vouchers to
its students who could choose private schools that were called
"segregation academies." 38 After the Supreme Court struck this
down, some southern states and school districts repealed
segregation mandates and adopted "freedom of choice plans."
Yet, racial intimidation and discrimination kept black and white
students in the separate schools. 39
In Green v County School Board, the court declared that
freedom of choice plans improperly placed responsibility for
remedying segregation on its victims, rather than on the

so Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Historic Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation,
and the Need for New Integration Strategies (Civil Rights Project /Proyecto Derechos
Civiles, UCLA Aug 2007), online at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-andthe-need-for-new-integration-strategies- 1/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
s See Adams u Richardson, 351 F Supp 636 (DDC 1973), affd Adams v Richardson,
480 F2d 1159 (DC Cir 1973).
32
391 US 430 (1968).
" 402 US 1 (1971) ("Swann I").
34
407 US 451 (1972).
" 413 US 189 (1974).
6 See text accompanying notes 32-55.
347 US 483 (1954).
"' See generally Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 Yale L J 1436
(1973). See also Griffin u County School Board, 377 US 218, 231-232 (1964).
39
See James R. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the
South, 53 Va L Rev 42, 43-44 (1967).

377]

CHARTERS

discriminatory school district. 4 0 Because of this, the Court held
that local school districts bore a heavy burden in justifying their
use over more effective remedies like busing.4 1
In the early 1970s, Swann u Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education held that because housing and school segregation
are deeply interrelated, neighborhood school assignments based
on geographic proximity did not satisfy the board's duty to
desegregate. 42 The Court further noted:
Independent of student assignment, where it is possible
to identify a "white school" or a "Negro school" simply by
reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff,
the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the
organization of sports activities, a prima facie case of
violation of substantive constitutional rights under the
Equal Protection Clause is shown. 43
In Wright v City of Emporia, the Supreme Court held that
once a school desegregation plan was in place, a new school
system could not be created that might impede the district's
ability to desegregate. 44 Specifically, the Court held that school
district boundaries between city and suburban schools-even if
drawn without discriminatory intent-could not limit the scope
or effectiveness of a school desegregation remedy if respecting
these boundaries could increase white flight from one of the local
school districts. 4 5
Another creative tactic was the creation of single-race black
schools with all black faculties to incentivize blacks to accept
segregation. 6 These black schools were often "chosen" by black
students who had been subjected to discrimination,
intimidation, and other forms of harassment in integrated
Green, 391 US at 441-42 ("Rather than further the dismantling of the dual
system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a
responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board.").
41 Id at
442.
42 Swann, 402 US at 28. ("'Racially neutral' assignment
plans proposed by school
authorities ... may be inadequate; such plans may fail to counteract the continuing
effects of past school segregation. . . . In short, an assignment plan is not acceptable
simply because it appears to be neutral.").
43 Id at 18.
44 Wright, 407 US at 470.
41 See id at 462.
46 Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North at 123-66 (cited in note 7).
40
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schools.4 7 Black school faculties became bulwarks of segregation,
fearing that they would lose their jobs in an integrated system.
These faculties consistently mobilized segments of the black
community to oppose school integration efforts.4 8
In Dayton Board of Education v Brinkman,4 9 the Court
declared that a school district, which in 1954 had operated an
optional all black city-wide high school with an all-black faculty
and three all-black elementary schools and segregated faculty
assignments, was segregated by law.50 It did not matter that
Dunbar High School was very popular among part of the black
population and that its black faculty fought to preserve it. The
Court found that it was an act that improperly facilitated
segregation.51
In Columbus Board of Education v Penick, 52 the Supreme
Court noted that despite the school district's avowedly strong
preference for neighborhood schools, in times of residential
transition, it created optional attendance zones to allow white
students to avoid integrated schools, which were often close to
the homes of white pupils. 53 The district allowed students in a
"small white enclave on Columbus' predominant black near east
side . . . to escape attendance at black schools," which the Court

called "a classic example of a segregative device designed to
permit white students to escape attendance at predominantly
black schools."54
Finally, in Milliken v Bradley,55 a federal court ruled that it
could not require the suburban districts to cooperate in any way
with the segregate central city district unless either they or the
state separately violated the constitution. Such a violation
included proof that the suburban district had intentionally

47
48

See id.
See id at 172-86; Keyes, 413 US at 235 (Powell concurring).

443 US 526 (1979).
See id at 541 (upholding Keyes, in which the Court held that "purposeful
discrimination in a substantial part of a school system furnishes a sufficient basis for an
inferential finding of a systemwide [sic] discriminatory intent").
" See id (agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the school district's actions
"perpetuated and increased public school segregation").
12
443 US 449 (1979).
5
See id at 461 n 8.
14
Id, quoting Penick u Columbus Board of Education, 429 F Supp 229, 245 (SD
Ohio 1977).
49

5o

"

418 US 717 (1974).
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committed a constitutional violation that caused segregation in
the city, or that the state had intentionally drawn the school
district boundaries to create segregation between the city and
the suburbs or had committed an act of housing discrimination
that caused the inner-district segregation.56
In Jenkins v Missouri,5 7 Justice O'Connor defined an interdistrict open enrollment violation:
[W]here those [suburban] districts "arrang[e] for white
students residing in [a segregated city district] to attend
schools in [white suburban districts]," Milliken I of course
permits

interdistrict

remedies.

. .

.

Such

segregative

effect may [also] be present where a predominantly black
district accepts black children from adjacent districts or
perhaps even where that fact of intradistrict segregation
actually causes whites to flee the district. . . for example,
to avoid discriminatorily, underfunded schools-and such
actions produce regional segregation along district lines.
In those cases, where a purely intradistrict violation has
caused significant interdistrict segregative effect, certain
interdistrict remedies may be appropriate.5 8
In the following sections, we will examine whether all single
race charter schools are purely a matter of protected individual
choice or whether they unconstitutionally place the burden of
integration on the victims of discrimination. When children or
their parents choose charter schools, it is like whites choosing
segregation academies. Do non-white children really choose
single race schools, when they have no real choice for schools
that are socially and racially integrated? When a charter opens
in a neighborhood in which it would be foreseeably single race,
does this run afoul of Swann and Keyes? Are single race
ethically themed charters permissible under Dayton and
Columbus? It is hard to see how single race charters are
permissible unless these cases are narrowed or overruled.
If open enrollment has a racially disparate impact, is it an
optional attendance boundary prohibited under Keyes? How
would it be different? When open enrollment transfers whites

56
1

See id at 745.
515 US 70 (1995).

"' Idat 110.
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from racially diverse districts to whiter ones or blacks from
integrated districts to majority non-white districts is it an
interdistrict violation under Milliken and Jenkins? Isn't this sort
of action exactly was Justice 0' Connor was referring to?
III. THE MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE WITH CHARTER SCHOOLS

Minnesota has the longest experience with charter schools
of any state in the country. Its first charter school opened in
1991 and today there are 150 with nearly 50,000 students.59
Charter school proponents promised that charter schools
would outperform the public schools and that competition with
charters would improve the public schools. They also promised
that by severing the link between segregated neighborhoods and
segregated schools, charter schools would allow parents of color
to attend white and more racially integrated schools.60
Alternatively, many charter school proponents argued that
segregated charters should be encouraged if they can educate
students better than traditional public schools. 61
A.

Charters and Segregation

In the Twin Cities, charter schools are much more likely to
be non-white segregated than traditional schools and charter
students are much more likely to attend a segregated school
than traditional public school students.

'9 Failed Promises: Assessing Charter Schools in the Twin Cities *1 (Institute on
Race
and
Poverty
2008),
online
at
http: //www.law.umn.edu/uploads/5f/ca/
5fcac972c2598a7a50423850eed0f6b4/8-Failed-Promises-Assessing-Charter-Schools-inthe-Twin-Cities.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
60
See Ted Kolderie, Creating the Capacity for Change: How and Why Governors
and Legislatures are Opening a New-Schools Sector in Public Education 144-45

(Education Week 2004); Chester E. Finn, Bruno V. Manno, and Gregg Vanourek, Charter
Schools in Action: Renewing Public Education 228-29 (Princeton 2000); Jay P. Greene,
Why School Choice Can Promote Integration, Education Week (2000), online at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2000/04/12/31greene.hl9.html (visited Oct 18, 2014);

Joe Nathan, Charter Schools: Creating Hope and Opportunity for American Education
56-57 (Jossey-Bass 1996). In Michigan, for instance, civil rights advocates collaborated
with market proponents to pass charter school legislation to empower poorly performing
students of color. See Christopher Lubienski, Public Schools in Marketized

Environments: Shifting Incentives and Unintended Consequences of Competition-Based
EducationalReforms, 111 Am J Educ 464, 472-473 (2005).
61
See Bruno V. Manno, Gregg Vanourek, and Chester E. Finn, Jr, Charter Schools:
Serving DisadvantagedYouth, 31 Educ & Urban Soc 429, 439-441 (1999).
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The percentage of charters which are predominantly nonwhite has been high since the beginning of the movement,
remaining in the mid-50s for most years since 1995-1996 (Chart
1). The share of charters that are integrated has varied very
little from around 18 to 20 percent. This is despite the fact that,
among traditional schools in the region, the percentage that are
integrated doubled from 20 to 40 percent while the percentage

W121 gMap 1: MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL (CENTRAL REGION)
Race and Ethnicity
Charter Schools, 2012-2013

.IMmill

B H

g
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that are non-white segregated share has remained well below
the share for charter schools during the same period. 62
(hart 1: Charter School Enrollments in the Twin Cities, 1996-2013

Most non-white segregated schools are in the core of the
region (Map 1) and many are single-race schools (or very close).
Students of color attending charter schools were roughly twice
as likely to be in a segregated school setting as their
counterparts in the traditional public schools in 2012-2013-88
to 44 percent for black students; 76 to 38 percent for Hispanics;
and 82 to 38 percent for Asians.63
Eighty-eight percent of black students in charters attended
non-white segregated schools in 2012-2013, up from 81 percent
in 2000-2001; 76 percent of Hispanic charter students attended
non-white segregated schools in 2012-2013, up from 69 percent
in 2000-2001; and 82 percent of Asian charter students
attended non-white segregated schools in 2012-2013, a slight
improvement from 85 percent in 2010-2011.64

62
See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update *3 (Institute on
Metropolitan
Opportunity Oct 2013), online at http: //www.1aw.umn.edu/uploads/
16/65/1665940a907fdbe 31337 27 1af*733 353d/Charter- School-Up date -2 013-final.pdf
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
61 Id at *5.

64

Id.
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Charter enrollments peaked at 68 percent non-white in
2003-2004 but growth since then has been split more evenly,
and the percentage of charter students who are non-white fell to
56 percent in 2012-2013 (down from 57 percent in 2010-2011).
Charter schools are much more likely to serve poor students
than traditional schools but recent years have seen a sharp
decline in the percentage of charter students who are poor. In
2012-2013, 51 percent of charter students were eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch compared to 29 percent in other public
schools, but the charter number represents a decline of six
points in just two years, from 57 percent in 2010-2011.65
B.

White Flight Charters-Present-Day Segregation
Academies?

Will Marshall of the Progressive Policy Institute noted in
the early 1990s:
It was so important that [charter schools] started in
Minnesota with Upper Midwest progressives and then
went to another progressive state like California. It could
not have started in the south with a different racial
history. I talked with the Dems in my home state

61

Id at *2.
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Virginia, and they were not convinced. They
[chartered schools] as segregation academies.6 6
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Early studies of charter schools documented cases where
white charter students attended charter schools that were
significantly whiter than their traditional public school
counterparts. 67 One study found that predominantly white
charter schools tended to appear in areas where the public
schools were becoming more racially diverse. 68 In Mississippi,
for example, charter schools were 60 percent whiter than the
hosting school districts.
In Minnesota, the number of predominantly white charters
is increasing, and many are located in suburban areas where the
traditional schools are becoming more racially diverse. 69 In
2000-2001, white charter students were actually less likely to be
in a predominantly white school than their traditional school
counterparts-56 percent compared to 81 percent. 70 However, by
2012-2013,
the share of white charter students in
predominantly white schools had risen to 73 percent while it
declined to 53 percent in traditional schools.7 1
The number of predominantly white charters in the suburbs
grew by 40 percent in just five years from 20 percent in 20072008 to 28 percent in 2012-2013.72 More than a third of these
were part of a single system of charters. 73 The Friends of
Education is the authorizer for 17 charters in the Twin Cities

6

See Ember Reichgott Junge, Zero Chance of Passage: The Pioneering Charter

School Story 188 (Beaver's Pond 2012).
67 For a list of these studies, see Linda A. Renzulli and
Lorraine Evans, School
Choice, CharterSchools, and White Flight, 52 Soc Problems 398, 401 (2005).
£8 Id.
69

See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update at *6 (cited in note 62).

See Failed Promises at *3 (cited in note 59).
See Chart 2.
72 These counts exclude five predominantly white
schools that are special cases.
Sobriety High South, Arona Academy of Sobriety High, and Bluesky charter schools were
predominantly white in both years, as were Lionsgate Academy in 2012-13 and Liberty
High School in 2007-08. However, the Sobriety High Schools were very small (they have
since closed), and their demographic mixes were likely determined by factors other than
neighborhood and race. Similarly, Lionsgate Academy specializes in students with
special needs related to Asperger's Syndrome or autism-related symptoms, and Liberty
High School was a special education school. Bluesky (which was located in St. Paul in
2007-2008 and West St. Paul in 2012-2013) is likely to be less closely tied to its
neighborhood than other schools because it is an online school.
7
See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update at *6 (cited in note 62).
70
71

CHARTERS

377]

393

metro.74 Twelve of them were predominantly white in 20122013-ten in the suburbs and two in St. Paul. 75
By 2012-2013, fifteen out of twenty-eight (54 percent) of the
very white mostly suburban charters had white student
percentages more than five percentage points higher than the
traditional school(s) within whose attendance boundary they
were located. 76 (These charters are circled on Map 2.) Clearly,
whether by intent or not, more and more suburban charters are
facilitating white flight from increasingly diverse traditional
schools in the suburbs.

74
7
7

See id.
See id.
See id.
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Stories about the emergence of some of these schools
provides important context. They often appear or grew rapidly
in racially diverse suburban areas, particularly when there was
local opposition to school district actions which might increase
racial integration in local schools. In the early 2000s, the Apple
Valley-Rosemount school district was pressured by civil rights
advocates to correct a racially gerrymandered school boundary.
The school-at-issue's catchment or attendance boundary
connected a largely Latino occupied trailer part with a non-
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contiguous neighborhood where affordable rental housing was
mostly inhabited by black families. In creating this noncontiguous boundary, nearby schools remained comparatively
white. Once this boundary was corrected, the state sponsored a
new predominantly white charter school named Paideia
Academy located next to the newly integrated public school
created by the boundary change.77
In the early 2000s, as the Osseo school district attempted to
integrate a white neighborhood school named Weaver Lake
elementary, the nearby all-white charter, Beacon Academy,
surged in enrollment.78 In 2010, the affluent high-performing
Eden Prairie school district, which was 25 percent non-white,
completed a controversial school redistricting plan that virtually
eliminated racial differences that had been increasing across its
elementary schools.79 White parents who did not want to go to
newly integrated schools went in increasing numbers to the local
all-white charter in that district.80 The number of white
students using open enrollment to attend schools in a
neighboring district that was 90 percent white also increased
significantly.
The Bloomington School District has twice considered
integrated student boundaries. Each time it has chosen not to do
so, because of white parent opposition in the first case. The
existence of a predominantly white charter school, the
Friendship Classical Academy was not helpful in either
instance.81
7
See Myron Orfield, Regional Strategies for Racial Integration of Schools and
Housing Post-ParentsInvolved, 29 L & Ineq J 149, 155-56 (2011). For another example
of the effects of attendance boundaries, see Margaret C. Hobday, Geneva Finn, and
Myron Orfield, A Missed Opportunity:Minnesota's FailedExperiment with Choice-Based
Integration,35 Wm Mitchell L Rev 936, 965-68 (2009).
78 See Baris Gumus-Dawes, Myron Orfield, and Thomas Luce, Dividing Lines: East
Versus West in Minneapolis Suburbs, in Erica Frankenberg and Gary Orfield, eds, The
Resegregation of Suburban Schools: A Hidden Crisis in American Education 113, 130
(Harvard 2012).
79 See Susan Eaton, Not Your Father'sSuburb: Race and Rectitude in a Changing
Minnesota Community *8-9 (One Nation Indivisible 2012), online at http://www.
onenationindivisible.org/wp-content /uploads/2012/03/ONlrptNotYourFathersSuburb
FIN.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
80

See id at 16.

Kenyatta Bolden, Backing Down from Brown: The Resegregation of the
Bloomington School District (2004) (on file with author); Carrie Rudd, Bloomington
Middle School Boundaries (2007) (on file with author); Kelly Smith, Bloomington
Releasing Proposed Boundary Maps, StarTribune (Nov 11, 2010); Kelly Smith,
Bloomington Schools Consider Changing Boundaries, StarTribune (Dec 5, 2010).
81
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Charter Schools Don't Perform as Well as Traditional Public
Schools

Despite a great deal of evidence to the contrary, charter
school advocates continue to argue that charter schools in
Minnesota improve student performance. 82 Recently, in the
Twin Cities, comparisons by charter advocates have shifted to
highlight the performance of a few cherry-picked charters
serving high-poverty populations (charters which are also
largely single-race) and trying to discredit system-wide
comparisons.83
Prior to IMO's three studies, several studies examined the
performance of charter schools in Minnesota. A 2003 Brookings
Institution study found that a third of the charter schools in
Minnesota failed to perform adequately according to the state's
definition, compared to just 13 percent of all traditional public
schools.8 4
The Great Lakes Center found that charter schools in
Minnesota performed worse, on average, than demographically
identical traditional schools. 85 Over 60 percent of charters
showed average test scores that were lower than expected, given
their student characteristics. 86 The study also showed that the
overall test score performance (pass rates) of charter schools did
not improve over time for five of the six math and reading

82 Virtually every study of the impact of charter schools
on student performance in
Minnesota has found that charters are out-performed by their traditional counterparts,
after controlling for school characteristics like poverty rates among students. For a
review of several of these studies, see FailedPromises at *1 (cited in note 59).
"' See Minnesota Charters 2014: Building a High-Impact Charter Sector. Closing
the Opportunity/Achievement Gap (Charter School Partners Jan. 6, 2014), online at
http: //charterschoolpartners.org/culture-of-reform-and-achievement /minnesota-charters2014-building-a-high-impact-charter-sector-closing-the-opportunityachievement-gap/
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
84 See Tom Loveless, How Well Are American Students Learning? With Special
Sections on Homework, Charter Schools, and Rural School Achievement: Part III Charter
Schools: Achievement, Accountability, and the Role of Expertise *31 Table 3-2 (Brookings
2003),
online
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2003/10/
education%201oveless/l0education loveless.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
"' See Gary Miron, Chris Coryn, and Dawn M. Mackety, Evaluating the Impact of
Charter Schools on Student Achievement: A Longitudinal Look at the GreatLakes States
(Western Michigan University, The Evaluation Center Jun 2007), online at
http: //greatlakescenter.org/docs/Research/Miron Charter Achievement/Miron Charter%
20Achievement.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014). See especially Appendix E on Minnesota
charter school performance.
86 See id at Appx
E 7-8.
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tests-only the 5th grade reading score showed slight
improvement.87 In addition, charters showed little or no
improvement over time compared to demographically equivalent
traditional schools. Minnesota charters ranked fifth out of the
six states in this comparison.8 8
Finally, the Office of the Minnesota Legislative Auditor
(OLA) in 2008 found that when compared to district schools with
similar demographics, charter schools generally did not perform
as well.8 9 Only 15 percent of charter schools performed better
than their traditional counterparts.9 0 More than half performed
worse in math and about 40 percent performed worse in reading
tests.9 1 When the study accounted for the higher student
mobility rates in charter schools, the difference between the
performances of charter school and district schools narrowed,
but charter schools still performed worse than traditional
schools. 92
Charter school boosters had little to say in their defense. A
2004 evaluation of the Minnesota charter sector as a whole by
one of its founders does not offer a systematic assessment,
focusing instead on anecdotes of individual schools. 93 The study
points to the inadequacy of snapshot test scores for adequately
measuring charter school performance, suggesting that mixed
performance by this measure reflects the charter schools'
demographics and their relative short time in operation.9 4
Reflecting a common recent trend, charter proponents
suggests that the question "How are charter schools doing?"
should be modified to ask "How is chartering doing-as a
mechanism for getting the new, different, and better schools it

87

See id.

88 See id at Appx E 12, 16, 17. The states included in the study were Illinois,

Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. See id.
89 See Office of the Legislative Auditor, Evaluation Report: Charter Schools 13-15
(June 2008), online at http://www.auditor.leg. state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/charterschools.pdf
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
90 See id at 21.
91 See id.
92 See id at 26-27. The OLA study has a number of
methodological shortcomings
that raises some concerns with the findings, detailed in our 2008 study FailedPromises.
See FailedPromises at 23-24 (cited in note 59).
93 See Jon Schroeder, Ripples of Innovation: Charter Schooling in Minnesota, The
Nation's First Charter School State *32 (Progressive Policy Institute 2004), online at
http://www.dlc.org/documents/MNCharters_0504.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
94 See id at 32-33.
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must now have?" 95 It would appear that switching attention
from the performance of charter schools to the chartering
process itself is a step toward relaxing the strict performance
standards the taxpayers demand from all traditional public
schools, including and especially the charters.
The Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity (IMO) authored
2008, 2012, and 2013 reports providing clear evidence that
traditional public schools outperformed charter schools after
controlling for student poverty, race, special education needs,
limited language abilities, student mobility rates, and school
size. 96 Consistent with the earlier studies and other research,
IMO's 2013 report found that student poverty (measured by
eligibility for free or reduced price lunch) was the dominant
factor in the performance of schools in 2012-2013.97 The results
showed that, all else equal, proficiency rates were 11.2
percentage points lower for math and 5.9 percentage points
lower for reading in charter elementary schools than in
traditional elementary schools. 9 8 Identical regressions run with
2010-2011 data showed shortfalls of 7.5 (math) and 4.4
(reading) percentage points, implying that charters as a group
are doing worse now than two years ago.9 9
Charts 3 and 4 demonstrate the relationship between
student performance and the school characteristic which is, by
far, the dominant explanatory variable in the statistical
analysis-poverty. The predicted line in these figures
corresponds to the performance level one would expect from a
school given its student poverty rate. In 2012-2013, the math
performance of students in only 31 percent of charter schools
was better than expected given the poverty levels of these
schools-the rest, 69 percent, under-performed expectations. 100
This represents a significant step back from 2010-2011 when 51
percent of charters out-performed expectations. 101 Similarly, the

95 Id at 43.
96 The regression results for 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 are available on request and
the 2007-2008 analysis is available in FailedPromises at *27 Table 1 (cited in note 59).
The analysis of 2012-2013 data uses a set of variables identical to the 2010-2011
analysis.
97 See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update at *8 (cited in note 62).

99

See id.
See id.

100

See id.

98

101 See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update at *8-9 (cited in note 62).
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reading performance of students in just 36 percent of charter
schools was better than expected (compared to 39 percent in the
2010-2011 analysis). 102
Traditional elementary schools also fared better for the
most part than charters in the study, with 58 percent outperforming expectations in math and 54 percent doing so in
reading. 103 Both of these rates represent improvements in the
public schools from the 2010-2011 analysis. 104
If charters as a group have so consistently under-performed
traditional schools, why are charter schools so commonly
extolled in the press for student performance? The answer can
be seen in the public relations strategies of the charter
proponents. Shortly after school testing data is released, charter
advocates issue reports and press releases detailing the success
of cherry picked schools that "beat the odds"-schools with high
percentages of low-income students that had the highest
percentage of students proficient in reading or math on the
official statewide examinations.10 5
In examining the selection of schools "above the line" at
high poverty rates in Charts 3 and 4, there is a group of roughly
a dozen high-poverty charters exhibiting pass rates significantly
better than expected, and for the most part, better than their
traditional counterparts. This group represents a class of schools
that are important given the significant achievement gaps that
exist in the region (and the state) between white students and
black students. Research on why they are succeeding is clearly
needed. However the charter press does not discuss the entire
set of charters, nor note that most of the lowest performing
schools are also charters.

102

See id at 9.

'os

See id.
See id.

104

10 See, for example, Center for School Change Blog (Center for School Change
2014), online at http://centerforschoolchange.org/blog/ (visited Oct 18, 2014); Charter
School Partners
(Charter School Partners
2013),
online
at http: //www.
charterschoolpartners.org/(visited Oct 18, 2014). See also Joe Nathan, MinnPost recently
wrote about the "Beat the Odds" school where CSC offices are located, Center for School
Change
Blog
(Center for
School
Change
Feb
22,
2013),
online
at
http: //centerforschoolchange.org/2013/02/minnpost-recently-wrote-about-the-beat-theodds-school-where-csc-offices-are-located/ (visited Oct 18, 2014).
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Chart 3: Poverty and Math Proficiency Rates
in Twin Cities Elementary Schools, 2012-13
(correlation = -.84)
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Chart 4: Poverty and Reading Proficiency Rates
in Twin Cities Elementary Schools, 2012-13
(correlation = -.90)
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Chart 5: Poverty and Math Proficiency Rates
in Twin Cities Elementary Charter Schools, 2012-13
(correlation = -.84)
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Chart 6: Poverty and Reading Proficiency Rates
in Twin Cities Elementary Charter Schools, 2012-13
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Because of the charters' underperformance, there are costs
associated with using the charter system as a testing ground for
new ways to teach low-income students. 10 These can be seen in
Charts 5 and 6, which show the same information as Charts 3
and 4, but for charter schools alone. 107 The ovals on the chart
highlight all of the charters that are more than five percentage
points above or below the line showing predicted performance at
all free/reduced price lunch eligibility rates. 108 The student
counts in the chart show that there are many more students in
under-performing charters than in the high-performance
group.10 9 Among high-poverty charters, there are 14 percent
more students (5,694 versus 4,997) in charters under-performing
in math than in the high-performance schools and 43 percent
more (6,181 compared to 4,320) in schools under-performing in
reading. 110 The comparison is even more unbalanced in
moderate- and low-poverty schools where there are two to seven
times as many students in under-performing schools than in
high-performance charters.1'

The question is whether charters are the best path available
to discover ways to better serve low-income students and
students of color in order to eliminate achievement gaps with
non-poor and white students. One clear cost of the charter
approach is a greater share of students, overall, in schools that
are significantly under-performing expectations. Every year
since the charters started, they have underperformed the public
schools. Overall, charters are worse than the public schools, and
because of competition with the charters the public schools are
weaker than they would otherwise be. Because of the enormous
loss of revenue related to the loss of pupils to charters, the
Minneapolis public schools have not been able to fire teachers
and close buildings fast enough to avoid cutting important
remedial programs designed to reduce the achievement gap.

106 See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update at *10 (cited in note 62).
107

See id.

10

See id.

See id.
n0 See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update at *10 (cited in note 62).
n. See id.
109
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IV. THE IMPACT OF CHARTERS ON THE TWIN CITIES REGION'S
CENTRAL CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS

The two central city school districts in the Twin Cities each
lose large numbers of students to charter schools-losses that
have contributed greatly to declining enrollments in
Minneapolis and St. Paul. 112 Charter advocates would argue
that the competition leading to these losses enhance the overall
performance of the region's schools. 113 The previous section on
school performance shows that these gains are spotty at best
and they come at a cost. 114
State money follows students out of public schools to charter
schools. 115 When enrollments fall rapidly, total costs do not go
down as quickly because rapid enrollment declines require costly
actions like school closures, teacher and staff cutbacks, and
administrative reorganizations. 116 As a result, districts losing
students must devote efforts and resources to deal with the costs
of decline, often to the detriment of other educational
priorities. 117 For instance, the Minneapolis and St. Paul school
districts have had to close school in communities that do not
want to lose schools and they have had to fire teachers in order
of seniority, which often removes young energetic teachers the
district needs. 118 The two city districts have also spent the last
ten to fifteen years dealing with one fiscal crisis after another,
crises due at least in some part to enrollment losses to charter
schools. 119
Table 2 shows enrollment trends in the Minneapolis and St.
Paul school districts from 2000-2001 to 2011-2012 in
conjunction with losses to charter schools.120 Enrollments
112

See id at 12.

ns See id.
114 See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update
at *12 (cited in note 62).
n. See Minnesota House of Representatives Research Department, Charter Schools
(Nov 2005), online at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/chrtschl.pdf (visited Oct
14, 2014).
n1 See id.
117
See id.
11

See id.

See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update at *12 (cited in note 62).
See id. The "resident students attending charters" estimates were derived from
two sources. The Minnesota House Research Department provides estimates for all
districts for the period 2006-2007 through 2011-2012. Estimates for the period from
2000-2001 through 2009-2010 are available from other IMO research on open
19

120
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declined during this period by 29 percent in Minneapolis (from
48,834 to 34,436) and by 16 percent in St. Paul (from 45,115 to
37,864). During this period, state and federal aid per pupil to
Minneapolis fell by about 12.5 percent between 2007-2008 and
2012-2013 by about 5.5 percent for St. Paul (correcting for
inflation). 121
In Minneapolis, almost half of the enrollment declines
during the period from 2000-2012 were the result of additional
students leaving the district for charters-6,800 more resident
students attended charters in 2011-2012 than in 2000-2001,
while total enrollments declined by 14,400. In St. Paul, the
contribution was even greater-58 percent (4,200 out of 7,250) of
total enrollment declines were from aggregate losses to
charters. 122
Although some of these losses were to charter schools which
out-perform some traditional schools in the two districts, Charts
3-6 make it clear that most were not. 123 This begs the question
of whether the enormous stresses imposed on two of the region's
largest school districts have been worth the costs. 124

enrollments. For a description of this data set, see Open Enrollment and Racial
Segregation in the Twin Cities at *1 (cited in note 23). The two data series are not fully
comparable, so the House Research data was used for 2006-07 through 2011-2012,
while the earlier years were extrapolated from the 2006-2007 House Research estimate
using growth rates computed from the IMO open enrollment data set. Total enrollment
data are from the Minnesota Department of Education.
121 Computed from Minnesota Department of Education (MDE) Revenue Summary
Reports; total enrollment data from MDE data reports; and from Bureau of Labor
Statistic estimates of the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.
122

See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update at *12-13 (cited in note 62).

The two districts lose large numbers of students to open enrollment as well. In 2010, the
net loss in Minneapolis was about 1,200 students and in St. Paul it was about 700. Open

Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities at *12 Table 2 (cited in note 23).
123 See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update
at *13 (cited in note 62).
124

See id. The third district, Anoka, is not hurt as badly.
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Table 1: Student Losses to Charters from the Minneapolis and St. Paul School Districts, 2000-2012

Resident Students
Losses to Charters
Year
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12

Minneapolis

St. Paul

2,007
2,100
3,006
3,972
5,190
5,683
6,514
7,730
8,000
8,261
8,399
8,818

2,871
3,343
3,472
3,792
4,029
4,225
4,446
4,888
5,566
6,100
6,644
7,072

Resident Students
Attending District Schools
Minneapolis
48,834
48,156
46,037
43,397
40,510
38,532
37,033
34,999
34,680
34,441
34,336
34,436

St. Paul
45,115
44,201
43,923
42,510
41,123
41,267
40,658
39,681
38,560
38,096
37,859
37,864

Resident Student Losses
as a Percentage of
District Enrollments Plus
Resident Student Losses
Minneapolis
4
4
6
8
11
13
15
18
19
19
20
20

St. Paul
6
7
7
8

9
9
10
11
13
14
15
16

Sources: Minnesota House Research Department and Minnesota Department of Education.

V. THE COMPETITIVE IMPACT OF CHARTER SCHOOLS
One of the primary justifications for charters schools is the
argument that, by engendering competition, they will enhance
the performance of the entire school system, including
traditional schools forced to respond to charter school
competition. 125 However, a number of commonly observed
actions by both charter and traditional schools undermine this
argument, include skimming students, public school initiated
charters, and aimed student recruitment. 12 6
There is evidence that in some places charter schools may
be skimming the least-costly-to-educate students from the public
school system.127 The degree to which charter schools skim such
students depends on the financial incentives they face through
the structure of the per-pupil education funding formulas. 12 8
Such skimming increases per student costs for traditional

See id at *12.
See generally See Charter Schools in the Twin Cities: 2013 Update (cited in note
62); FailedPromises (cited in note 59).
127 See Failed Promises at *36-37
(cited in note 59).
128 See id
at 38.
121

126
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districts while, at the same time, forcing them to deal with the
extra costs associated with declining enrollments. 12 9
While student skimming was once relatively limited in the
Twin Cities, it is beginning to show up in some predominantly
white urban and suburban neighborhoods where the schools are
more racially diverse than the neighborhoods. 130 As noted above,
charter schools that skim students create new avenues for white
flight and deepen racial and economic segregation in the
traditional public school system. 131
A number of charter schools in the Twin Cities have
competed by serving specific ethnic niches, a practice
particularly detrimental for students of color because it
contributes to racial and economic segregation. By concentrating
poverty in ethnically-segregated schools, ethnic-niche-based
competition increases the number of students of color in exactly
the kinds of schools that research shows to be the lowest-

performing. 1 32
One common way public school districts compete with

charter schools is to initiate charter schools of their own. 133 In
response to ethnic-niche-based competition from charter schools
and the financial incentives that reward educating costly-toeducate students, school districts have created their own highlysegregated charter schools. 134 For instance, Minneapolis Public
Schools caved to parental pressure and opened the Hmong
International Academy, intended as an alternative to the nowprimarily-black Lucy Stark Laney Elementary-effectively
consigning each student body to institutions made up of "their

own" racial group.

This trend, along with new "ethno-centric"

programs within traditional schools and some magnet schools

have further intensified segregation within the traditional
public school system. 135
Ultimately, the impact of ethnic-niche-based competition on
traditional public schools depends on the underlying type of

129

See id at 36-38.

"s See id at 37.
.s. See Failed Promises at *47 (cited in note 59).
132

See id.

133

See id.
See id.

134

.s. See Failed Promises at *47 (cited in note 59).
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niche. 136 Given that research clearly implies that student body
diversity is associated with better academic outcomes-such as
higher graduation rates, higher college attendance rates, higher
earnings in jobs, and more comfort living and working in an
integrated context-niche competition based on race, disability,
or income is counter-productive. 137
It is also not clear that academic factors or outcomes are
enhanced by competition in a charter-based system. Contrary to
what charter proponents expected, there is evidence that school
choice decisions by parents are often not based primarily on
academic performance.1 38 Parents often choose schools based on
a host of other factors including location, safety, transportation,
and special educational preferences.1 39 In addition, rather than
promoting diverse curricular and instructional practices, charter
schools often revert to traditional forms of curriculum and
instruction. At the same time, charter school competition
frequently pushes public schools to mount marketing
campaigns, diverting resources away from classrooms.
There is strong evidence, in particular, that parents of color
as well as white parents often choose a school because it mostly
serves students of the same race as their child. When parents
choose schools based on race instead of academic quality, the
result will virtually always be that students of color end up in
segregated schools with very high poverty rates. Because high
poverty schools are associated with high drop out rates, low
college attendance, and low job earning, this undermines
academic outcomes for those schools and for students of color.

1s6
1s7

See id.
See id.

"s See Failed Promises at *44 (cited in note 59), citing Nanette Asimov, Few Parents

Seize Chance to Transfer Schools/'No Child Left Behind' Made Offer Mandatory (The
San Francisco Chronicle Oct 9, 2003), online at http://www.sfgate.com/education/
article/Few-parents-seize-chance-to-transfer-schools-2554068.php (visited Oct 18, 2014);

Few in Martin Take Advantage of Options under US School Law (Palm Beach Post July
20, 2004).
19
See Failed Promises at *44 (cited in note 59), citing Christopher Lubienski,

School Diversification in Second-Best Education Markets: International Evidence and
Conflicting Theories of Change, 20 Educ Pol 323, 323-44 (May 2006); Christopher

Lubienski, Innovation in Education Markets: Theory and Evidence on the Impact of
Competition and Choice in Charter Schools, 40 Am Educ Rsrch J 395, 417-19 (2003).
Numerous studies show that a substantial share of charter schools are using a "back-tobasics" or "core knowledge" approaches in the classroom-standard curricular
approaches used by traditional public schools.
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A choice environment of this sort is not the great equalizer,
as charter proponents argue, because not all choices are created
equal. 140 This is because the choices available to white and
middle-class parents invariably includes better performing
schools than those available to lower-income parents and
parents of color. 141 Existing social and economic inequalities that
shape the lives of parents thus directly shape their school
choices and the set of schools they consider for their children,
further reproducing these inequalities. 142
However, a significant body of literature suggests that
charter schools compete by skimming the most able, least-costlyto-educate students from traditional public schools. 143 Under
140
141
142
143

See Failed Promises at *46 (cited in note 59).
See id.
See id.
See Failed Promises at *36 (cited in note 59). See generally Robert Bifulco and

Helen F. Ladd, School Choice, Racial Segregation, and Test-Score Gaps: Evidence from
North Carolina'sCharter School Program, 26 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 31 (2006); Robert
Bifulco, Helen F. Ladd, and Stephen Ross, Public School Choice and Integration:
Evidence from Durham, North Carolina (National Center for Analysis of Longitudinal
Data in Education Research Feb 14, 2008), online at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/1001151_school choice.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014); Kevin Booker, Ron

Zimmer, and Richard Buddin, The Effect of Charter Schools on School Peer Composition
(RAND Education Oct 2005), online at http://www.ncspe.org/publications-files/
RAND WR306.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014); Casey D. Cobb and Gene V. Glass, Ethnic
Segregation in Arizona Charter Schools, 7 Educ Pol Analysis Archives 1 (1999); Thomas

S. Dee and Helen Fu, Do Charter Schools Skim Students or Drain Resources?, 23 Econ
Educ Rev 259 (2004); Nevbahar Ertas, Public School Responses to Charter School
Presence (Georgia Institute of Technology and Georgia State University 2007), online at
https: //smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/16280/ertas nevbahar_200708_phd.p
df?sequence=1 (visited Oct 18, 2014); Edward Fiske and Helen F. Ladd, When Schools
Compete: A Cautionary Tale (Brookings 2000); Erica Frankenberg and Chungmei Lee,

Charter Schools and Race: A Lost Opportunity for Integrated Education, 11 Educ Pol
Analysis Archives (2003); Jeffrey R. Henig and Jason A. MacDonald, Locational

Decisions of Charter Schools: Probing the Market Metaphor, 83 Soc Sci Q 962 (2002);
Goodwin Liu and William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation,74 Fordham
L Rev 791 (2005); Christopher Lubienski and Charisse Gulosino, Choice, Competition,

and Organizational Orientation: A Geo-Spatial Analysis of Charter Schools and the
Distribution of Educational Opportunities (National Center for the Study of
Privatization in Education Oct 2007), online at http://www.ncspe.org/publications-files/
OP148.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014); Yongmei Ni, Are Charter Schools More Racially
Segregated Than TraditionalPublic Schools? (Michigan State University, The Education
Policy Center Mar 2007), online at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED498628.pdf (visited
Oct 18, 2014); Linda A. Renzulli, District Segregation, Race Legislation, and Black
Enrollment in Charter Schools, 87 Soc Sci Q 618 (2006); Renzulli and Evans, 52 Soc
Problems 398 (cited in note 67); Amy Stuart Wells, Beyond the Rhetoric of Charter

School Reform: A Study of Ten CaliforniaSchool Districts (UCLA Charter School Study
1998); Amy Stuart Wells, et al, Charter Schools and Racial and Social Segregation: Yet
Another Sorting Machine?, in Richard D. Kahlenberg, ed, A Notion at Risk: Preserving
Public Education as an Engine for Social Mobility 169 (Century 2000).
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most charter laws, charter schools cannot pick and choose their
students. However, charter schools frequently shape their
student enrollment through their recruitment and marketing
efforts, their parental involvement requirements, and their
discipline or expulsion practices. 144
How and where charter schools choose to advertise affects
their student recruitment. Their admission process usually
requires parent meetings with school officials, where the fit
between the school and family is informally scoped out. During
these meetings, students may be steered to apply or not apply
based on the expectations of both parties. Many charters ask
parents to sign a parental involvement contract, which requires
parents to volunteer a certain amount of hours to the charter
school. Students whose parents cannot commit to these parental
involvement contracts can be denied admissions. Finally,
charter schools can weed out troubled students after admission
through discipline and expulsion practices.
In St. Paul, for instance, Nova Classical Academy, which is
located in the predominantly white Groveland-Highland
neighborhood of St. Paul, effectively siphons off white middleclass students from the racially diverse traditional public
schools in the area.145 Similarly, some suburban school districts,
where individual schools are beginning to show signs of racial
and economic transition, have seen predominantly white
charters spring up near those schools.14 6 Examples of such
schools include Beacon Academy and Beacon Preparatory School
in Plymouth, Paideia Academy in Apple Valley, and Seven Hills
Classical Academy in Bloomington.1 4 7 All of these schools have
144 See FailedPromises at *36 (cited in note 59). See
also Wells, Beyond the Rhetoric
at 43 (cited in note 143); Geoffrey Walford, Diversity, Choice, and Selection in England
and Wales, 33 Educ Admin Q 158, 162 (1997).
14' As Henig and MacDonald show in the case of Washington,
DC, charter schools
could also skim non-white middle-class students in racially diverse school districts. See
Henig and MacDonald, Locational Decisions of Charter Schools, 83 Soc Sci Q at 962, 973,
975, 977 (cited in note 143). Yinghua Academy, a mostly Asian Chinese immersion school
in St. Paul, presents an example of such non-white skimming. The student poverty rate
at Yinghua Academy fluctuates around 10 percent-much lower than the poverty rates
of surrounding public schools.
146 See Failed Promises at *38 (cited in note
59).
147 See id. In 2005, twenty-two of the thirty-four charter
schools located in the Twin
Cities suburbs were predominantly white, four of them were non-white segregated, and
eight of them were integrated. Of these twenty-two predominantly white schools, three
went out of business, one was an online school, and four were specialty schools that did
not compete with public schools. Of the remaining fourteen predominantly white
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admission interviews, parental involvement requirements, and
strict disciplinary policies that can be used to selectively admit
students. 148 The result in many cases is an increase in the rate
of transition in surrounding traditional schools. 149
Segregative ethnic competition between traditional and
charter schools can be seen in the Twin Cities, especially in the
urban school districts that face severe competition from "ethnocentric" charters. Charter entrepreneurs have often targeted
segregated neighborhoods where the public schools are truly
terrible. They promise parents that their single-race alternative
will help their kids and many parents near terrible public
schools will try anything. In most cases, however, the charter
entrepreneurs' claims are grossly exaggerated. Even though the
public schools are terrible, their schools are often as bad or
worse. As a result, many children soon leave the charter to try
something else.
When children move to charter schools, the public schools
lose funding. And thus, to maintain student market share, the
public schools have sought waivers from civil rights rules to
create single-race themed public schools to compete with the
charter school marketers to keep student and their public
funding.
For example, as the Minneapolis and St. Paul public school
districts continued to lose their Hmong students to Hmongfocused charter schools, they decided to compete by starting
Hmong-focused programs or magnet schools of their own to
maintain their student "market share" and state funding
dollars. 150 To compete with the charters, both city districts had

suburban charter schools, six of them were located in areas where the closest traditional
public school showed increases in the non-white share of students, or increases of the
share of low-income students of at least five percentage points in the five years prior to
the emergence of the charter school. In fact, as the superintendent of Rosemount-Apple
Valley-Eagan school district notes, the emergence of Paideia Academy in Apple Valley
certainly increased the percentage of students of color at Cedar Park Magnet school-a
school that came into existence as a result of the school district's effort to desegregate its
racially identifiable schools. Of the eighteen students who left Cedar Park for Paideia
Academy, sixteen of them were white and only two were black. Similarly, of the 142
students that left Cedar Park this academic year, 72 percent were white. Personal
communication with John Currie, the Superintendent of District 196, November 2, 2008.
148 See Failed Promises at *38 (cited in note 59).
149

See id.

"s See Failed Promises at *41 (cited in note 59), citing Wameng Moua, Are Hmong
Students Making the Grades?, Twin Cities Daily Planet (Mar 25, 2008), online at
http://www.tedailyplanet.net /article/2008/03/19/are-hmong-schools-making-grades.html
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to seek exemptions from local civil rights rules that forbid such
single-race schools. Hmong International Academy, a Hmongfocused program, was the Minneapolis Public School District's
response to the district's declining Hmong enrollment. 15 1 The
Academy started as a program within the Lucy Laney
Elementary School building, a north Minneapolis school
attended by a relatively small group of Hmong students, along
with African-American students who constituted the majority of
the student body. 152 During the day, the children of different
races were kept apart at all times. Class periods were different
so that they never had to cross each other in the hallways. As
the program expanded, Hmong International Academy
subsequently moved to a separate location in North
Minneapolis. 153 What started as a "school within a school"
program that separated Hmong students from the AfricanAmerican students eventually led to the creation of two separate
school facilities, each primarily serving a specific racial group.1 54
Similarly, the St. Paul school district responded to losses of
Hmong students to Hmong-focused charters by creating a
Hmong-focused magnet school in the district's heavily Hmongpopulated Phalen Lake area. 155 Both of the resulting Hmong
schools in Minneapolis and St. Paul were low performing. Thus,
the single-race charters have not created a race to the top or
toward integration, but a race to the bottom and more profound
segregation.
VI. CHARTER MISMANAGEMENT

Minnesota Department of Education school data shows that
thirty-nine charter schools have closed since 1995.156 While the

reasons for these closings are not listed, newspaper and other
accounts suggest a disproportionate share of charter school
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
... See Failed Promises at *41 (cited in note 59).
112
See id.
..
s See id.
114
See id.
... See Failed Promises at *41 (cited in note 59), citing Moua, Are Hmong Students
Making the Grades? (cited in note 150).
116 Update of "FailedPromises: Assessing Charter Schools
in the Twin Cities" *9
(Institute on Race and Poverty Jan 2012), online at https: //www.law.umn.edu/
uploads/32/40/3240a8492f4c1d738fa87d975a4e5ea5/65_2012_Update of IRP 2008 Char
terSchoolStudy.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
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closings result from malfeasance or gross mismanagement of
some sort. 157 Map 3 shows the reasons for closing of fourteen
charter schools where the reasons could be found in the public
record.

nstI
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race,
endpovey
o

117

See id.

Map 3: MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL (CENTRAL REGION)

Reasons for Charter School Closings, 1995-2010
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Four of the fourteen closed as the result of criminal acts
involving misappropriation of funds. 158 Another seven involved
financial mismanagement or irregularities, which didn't cross
the threshold into illegality (although at least two instances
included elements suggesting malfeasance).1 59 Only three
closings were for relatively benign reasons like inadequate
facilities or enrollment declines. 160 While not a full sample of the
thirty-nine charter schools, it is suggestive of problems in the
charter sector not commonly seen in traditional public school
systems.16 1
VII. OPEN ENROLLMENT

Minnesota's pioneering open-enrollment system (OE)
enables parents and students to leave one school for another
without the expense of moving. 162 Open enrollment allows
parents a wider choice in matching a school's programs to a
child's needs and creates clearer competition between schools
that could encourage innovation or improvement. 163 Yet, open
enrollment also resembles past illegal discriminatory transfer
programs in that it appears to accelerate racial or economic
transition in racially diverse school districts. This is possible
because, after operating in compliance with the state
desegregation rule for a decade, open enrollment was exempted
from the rule in 2001.164
IMO's 2013 study analyzed OE's effects on racial and
economic segregation across the metro's sixty-nine school
districts between 2000 and 2010.165 It found that OE increased
segregation in the region, with the segregative trend growing
stronger over time. 166 In 2009-2010, 36 percent of OE moves
were segregative, 24 percent were integrative, and the rest were
"8 See id.
19

See id.

160See Update of 'FailedPromises"at *9 (cited in note 156).
16' There are no similar newspaper stories or other claims of public school
corruption.
162 See Open Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities
at *1 (cited in
note 23).
1s See
id.
164
See id.
16
See generally Open Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities at *1
(cited in note 23).
1
See id at 1.
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race-neutral. 16 7 The percentage of segregative moves grew
significantly during the decade from 23 percent to 36 percent, a
change due almost entirely to a large increase among white open
enrollees. 168
The region's three central cities (including St. Cloud) are
the biggest losers in OE. 169 Minneapolis, St. Paul, and St. Cloud
each lose substantial numbers of white students to nearby
districts. 170 Students open enrolling out of the three central city
districts were much more likely to be white than those
remaining behind, and virtually all were enrolling in districts
with white shares substantially greater than the district they
left. 171 Similarly, open enrollees into Minneapolis and St. Paul
were not only much less likely to be white than a typical student
in the districts they left, but they were less likely to be white
than resident students in the two city districts. 172 Many racially
diverse suburban districts also lost substantial numbers of white
students to adjacent white suburban districts, and the districts
that had the largest net gains from OE were a group of
predominantly white districts physically close to more diverse
urban and suburban districts. 173 The following tables help to
illustrate the racial and economic segregation trends resulting
from OE.

See id at 1, 8 Table 1. The shares are similar for the poverty measure. The
threshold for classifying a move as segregative or integrative was an inter-district
difference of more than 10 percentage points in the relevant shares. See Table 1 and the
associated discussion.
16s See Open Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities at *1 (cited in
note 23).
169
See id.
170 See
id.
171 See id
at *9.
167

172

See Open Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities at *9 (cited in

note 23).
17s See id
at 14.
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Table 2: Distribution of Integrative and Segregative Open
Enrollment Moves by Race 2000-01 and 2009-10
Racial/Ethnic Group

2000-01
Integrative Segregative

2009-10
Integrative Segregative

% Point Change

it.
7%

Seg

White

12%

20%

19%

36%

16%

Non-white

29

36

36

38

2

Black

28

40

26

32

-8

Hispanic

n.a.

n.a.

6

12

n.a.

n.a.

Asian

n.a.

n.a.

13

14

n.a.

n.a.

Total

16

23

24

36

Free-Red. Price Lunch Elig.

21

27

30

33

13
6

Integrative: A move by a white student from a district where the white percentage of students is more than
10 percentage points higher than the white share in the receiving district. The equivalent calculation is made for
each racial/ethnic group.
Segregative: A move by a white student from a district where the white percentage of students is more than
10 percentage points lower than the white share in the receiving district. The equivalent calculation is made for
each racial/ethnic group.
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Table 3: Open Enrollment by Race and Income, City Districts in 2009-2010

District
Minneapolis
St. Paul
St. Cloud

Pre-OE
Resident
Students
44,744
43,926
10,919

Open
Enrollments
Out
2,452
2,458
1,234

District
Minneapolis
St. Paul
St. Cloud

Pre-OE
Resident
Students
% White
28
26
76

Average
Open
Open
Enrollments % Non-white Enrollments
Out
Receiving
In
% White
Districts
% White
61
54
22
64
53
25
92
94
92

District
Minneapolis
St. Paul
St. Cloud

Pre-OE
Open
Resident
Enrollments
Students
Out
174
% FRED
%FRED
67
28
72
48
47
33

Open
Enrollments
In
1,256
1,775
38

Average
% FRED
Receiving
Districts
36
37
24

Open
Net as a % of
Enrollment
Pre-OE
Net
Resident Total
-1,196
-3
-683
-2
-1,196
-11

Open
Enrollments
In
%FRED
67
61
11

Average
%Non-white
Sending
Districts
53
64
94

Average
%FRED
Sending
Districts
45
37
26

Pre-OE Resident Students = Actual Enrollment + OE Out - OE In + CIY Students Out
- CIY Students In + Charter Students Out
Averages are weighted, based on the share of OE flows to or from all other districts.
Source: Minnesota Department of Education.

174"FRED"

signals students on Free and Reduced-cost Lunch.
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Table 4: Open Enrollment by Race and Income, Greatest Net Sender Suburban Districts
in 2009-2010

District
Anoka-Hennepin
Robbinsdale
Osseo
Burnsville-Eagan-Savage
Columbia Heights
Eastern Carver
White Bear Lake

Pre-OE
Resident
Students
42,251
12,968
22,877
10,738
3,248
9,576
8,789

Open
Enrollments
Out
1,956
1,563
2,215
1,044
731
666
757

Open
Enrollments
In
969
760
1,426
607
300
266
389

Open
Enrollment
Net
-987
-803
-789
-437
-431
-400
-368

Net as a % of
Pre-OE
Resident Total
-2
-6
-3
-4
-13
-4
-4

District
Anoka-Hennepin
Robbinsdale
Osseo
Burnsville-Eagan-Savage
Columbia Heights
Eastern Carver
White Bear Lake

Pre-OE
Resident
Students
%White
78
55
54
63
44
85
83

Open
Enrollments
Out
% White
63
51
46
66
62
82
79

Average
% White
Receiving
Districts
64
61
62
76
61
85
77

Open
Enrollments
In
%White
61
47
35
63
36
88
74

Average
%White
Sending
Districts
67
52
62
78
58
84
68

District
Anoka-Hennepin
Robbinsdale
Osseo
Burnsville-Eagan-Savage
Columbia Heights
Eastern Carver
White Bear Lake

Pre-OE
Resident
Students
%FRED
29
41
37
34
64
16
25

Open
Enrollments
Out
% FRED
38
40
43
29
46
11
21

Average
%FRED
Receiving
Districts
38
34
39
21
42
12
24

Open
Enrollments
In
% FRED
38
37
52
34
60
20
35

Average
%FRED
Sending
Districts
34
43
40
20
45
19
36

Pre-OE Resident Students Actual Enrollment + OE Out - OE In + CIY Students Out
- CIY Students In + Charter Students Out
Averages are weighted, based on the share of OE flows to or from all other districts.
Source: Minnesota Department of Education.

The group of suburban districts with the greatest net gains
from OE in 2009-2010 is composed primarily of districts gaining
students from white flight.175 White students represented more
than 87 percent of resident students in four-Minnetonka,
Edina, Orono, and Mahtomedi-and 79 percent in a fifth-St.
Anthony-New Brighton.1 76 OE inflows to each of these districts
i7 See id at 13. See also id at 15 Map 4; id at 22 Table 4.
176See Open Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities at *18 (cited in
note 23).
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were also predominantly white-ranging from 77 to 94 percent
white. 177 In each case, inflows to these districts came from
districts that were more diverse on average than the receiving
districts and, in each case, white students were over-represented
in OE (compared to the districts they came from).1 78
What happens when a very white district attracts only
white students from surrounding more racially diverse districts?
The most dramatic story involves the Minnetonka district,
which was the only one of the large westerns suburban districts
that both derived a large share of its enrollment from open
enrollment, but at the same time would not accept poor, nonwhite suburbs from Minneapolis through the voluntary
interdistrict transfer program connected to the Choice is Yours
settlement.
Two of the three largest OE flows into the Minnetonka
School District are from Hopkins and Eden Prairie, two districts
which are significantly more racially diverse (and diversifying
more rapidly) than Minnetonka. In 2009-2010, Minnetonka
resident students were 90 percent white, compared to 66 percent
in Hopkins and 75 percent in Eden Prairie. In that year, 354
students open enrolled from Hopkins and 88 percent of them
were white. The difference between open enrollees from Eden
Prairie and Eden Prairie's resident student mix were not as
great-156 students open enrolled from Eden Prairie to
Minnetonka and 76 percent were white. However, at that time,
Eden Prairie had recently gone through a controversial planning
process, which created more pro-integrative attendance
boundaries for its elementary schools. During that process, the
threat of open enrolling to Minnetonka was raised more than
once by opponents of the plan, and it is likely that OE flows (and
the threat of leaving) still exacerbate tensions associated with
racial change in the district.

See id.
See id. Although the racial differences are relatively small in some cases (the
white share of students in Orono was only five points higher than the average for a
typical sending district, for instance), they are consistent. See id at 18 n 16.
177
17s

3771
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MAP 4: MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL SOUTHWEST REGION
Percentage Minority Students in Open Enrollment Flows,
Southwest Twin Cities School Districts, 2O9-2010
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Table 5: Open Enrollment by Race and Income, Greatest Net Receiver Districts in 2009-2010

District
Minnetonka
Edina
Brooklyn Center
St Anthony-New Brighton
Orono
Fridley
Mahtomedi

Pre-OE
Resident
Students
7,449
7,062
1,662
1,055
2,121
2,398
2,670

Open
Enrollments
Out
239
108
300
52
104
284
51

Open
Enrollments
In
1,332
1,058
988
712
736
879
634

Open
Enrollment
Net
1,093
950
688
660
632
595
583

Net as a % of
Pre-OE
Resident Total
15
13
41
63
30
25
22

District
Minnetonka
Edina
Brooklyn Center
St Anthony-New Brighton
Orono
Fridley
Mahtomedi

Pre-OE
Resident
Students
% White
91
87
29
79
93
57
92

Open
Enrollments
Out
% White
80
63
21
44
87
46
67

Average
% White
Receiving
Districts
76
58
55
57
81
55
75

Open
Enrollments
In
% White
82
77
38
84
94
53
90

Average
% White
Sending
Districts
76
50
58
46
88
55
80

District
Minnetonka
Edina
Brooklyn Center
St Anthony-New Brighton
Orono
Fridley
Mahtomedi

Pre-OE
Resident
Students
%FRED
9
6
73
21
8
53
10

Open
Enrollments
Out
%FRED
19
28
64
62
12
57
45

Average
% FRED
Receiving
Districts
22
37
42
44
17
47
31

Open
Enrollments
In
% FRED
7
8
57
10
8
57
7

Average
%FRED
Sending
Districts
23
46
40
55
18
47
26

Pre-OE Resident Students = Actual Enrollment + OE Out - OE In + CIY Students Out
- CIY Students In + Charter Students Out
Averages are weighted, based on the share of OE flows to or from all other districts.
Source: Minnesota Department of Education

The largest OE flow into Minnetonka is from the Eastern
Carver district. In 2009-2010, this included 417 students, 88
percent of whom were white.1 79 Although Eastern Carver is
179

See Open Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities at *18 (cited in
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itself a predominantly white district, the district recently went
through a boundary drawing process for its two high schools
which maintained the separation between the city of Chaska
(which is increasingly diverse) and the areas surrounding it
(which are predominantly white). 18 0
The effect of open enrollment into Minnetonka weighed
heavily on more racially diverse adjacent districts as they
assessed potential boundary changes. 18 1 Hopkins attempted to
draw racially integrative boundaries in the early 2000s but
reversed course when 170 students in the whitest school
attendance area threatened to open enroll into Minnetonka. 182
Eastern Carver County decided against a racially integrative
high school boundary decision at least partly in light of its
already substantial open enrollment losses to Minnetonka. 183
Finally, in the most public of boundary decisions with racial
implications, Eden Prairie parents opposing the integrative
boundary decision threatened to open enroll into Minnetonka
when the district decided to implement the integrative
decision.18 4
As noted above, students open enrolling out of the central
city districts in the Twin Cities were much more likely to be
white than those remaining behind, and virtually all were
enrolling in districts with white shares substantially greater
than the district they left. 185 At the same time, open enrollees
into Minneapolis and St. Paul were not only much less likely to
be white than a typical student in the districts they left but they
were less likely to be white than resident students in the two
city districts. 186
The conduct of the Minnetonka school district, a
predominantly white, high-performing
district west of
Minneapolis, bears examination under Justice O'Connor's
construction of Milliken. Minnetonka is the whitest local district
in a group of four districts that interact extensively through
note 23). See also Table 5.
18o See id at *19.
181 See id.
182

See id.

"s See Open Enrollment and Racial Segregation in the Twin Cities at *19 (cited in
note 23).
184 See
id.
1ss
1s6

See id at *19-20.

See id at 9.
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Open Enrollment flows. It refused to become part of the Choice
is Yours settlement with the City of Minneapolis and continues
to refuse to admit Minneapolis students under that program.187
The state has taken no action to require its agent, the
Minnetonka school district, to become involved in this program,
despite the fact that it is roughly the same distance from
Minneapolis as two of its neighbors that do participate.
In the last decade, four suburban districts in the Twin
Cities western suburbs, Hopkins 18 8 , St. Louis Park18 9 , Eden
Prairie19 0 and Eastern Carver County' 91 completed boundary
changes with the potential to enhance racial integration in their
schools, as is required or permitted under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution, 192 parallel state
constitutional requirements or authority, and pursuant to the
Minnesota School Desegregation Rule. In pursuing this goal,
each of the districts was arguably constrained and undermined
by the actions of the state of Minnesota and its agent, the
Minnetonka school district, through the improper use of the
state-sponsored "open enrollment" system.
Before, during, and after the boundary decisions in the four
districts, and after they had refused to admit minority students
from Minneapolis, the Minnetonka school district actively
recruited parents and students away from other districts
through an expensive and unique paid-for advertising campaign
undertaken in neighborhood local newspapers or through other
media, including television and radio. 193 In 2010, as the
187 The West Metro Education Project (WMEP) is a voluntary group
of districts that
accept children from Minneapolis under the Choice is Yours Program. All of Minneapolis'
close suburbs except Minnetonka participate. See Member Districts (West Metro
Education Program), online at https: //sites.google.com/a/wmep.k 12.mn.us/wmep-k 12-mnus/member-districts (visited Oct 18, 2014).
188 Hobday, Finn, and Orfield, 35 Wm Mitch L Rev at 965-69 (cited in note 77).
189 Allie Shah, New Start Times, Boundaries for St. Louis Park Schools, (Star
Tribune Mar 17, 2010), online at http://www.startribune.com/local/west/87602057.html
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
190 Eaton, Not Your Father'sSuburb (cited in note 79).
191 Patrice Relerford, No Balancing Act for Chanhassen, Chaska, Star Tribune B1

(May 18, 2008); Kelly Smith, Chaska Schools Face Wholesale Turnover in Leaders, (Star
Tribune Nov 30, 2010), online at http://www.startribune.com/local/west/110907864.html
(visited Oct 18, 2014); Andrew Hart, An Analysis of the Chanhassen/ChaskaHigh
School Boundaries (June 2012) (student paper on file with author).
192 US Const Amend XIV,
§ 1.
193 See Building Support for Educators in Racially Changing Suburbs: NSCD
Statement on School Boundary Changes in Eden Prairie,Minnesota *4 (The National
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neighboring Eden Prairie School District sought to implement
pro-integrative boundary changes, Minnetonka increased its
media expenditure resulting in white flight from Eden Prairie to
Minnetonka. 194
As each of the four school districts has officially considered
or implemented legally permissible pro-integrative boundary
strategies, white parents whose children might be required to
attend more racially integrated schools in their districts than
they were presently attending either threatened to use, or
actually used, the state supported open-enrollment system to
attend much whiter schools in the Minnetonka School District.
According to the superintendents of the Hopkins and Eden
Prairie school districts, Minnetonka actively recruited these
parents, even as the metropolitan newspapers noted that their
actions would both cause more racial segregation in these
districts and make it more difficult to draw racially integrated
boundaries.19 5
This conduct by both white parents and the Minnetonka
school district and its implications was covered extensively in
the Minneapolis Star Tribune and other media. 196 In each case,
both the state and its agent, the Minnetonka school district,
were on notice that this conduct was causing greater segregation
Coalition on School Diversity), online at http://www.school-diversity.org/pdf/NCSD
Eden PrairieStatement.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014). See also Ron Schachter, Students
Wanted!: As CompetitionFor Students Heats Up, DistrictsAre Turning To AdvertisingAnd Are Prospering, (District Administration Feb 2007), online at http://www.district
administration.com/article/students-wanted (visited Oct 18, 2014).
194 See Lisa Kaczke, Study: Open Enrollment Causing Segregation (Sun Current
Jan
23, 2013), online at http://current.mnsun.com/2013/01/study-open-enrollment-causingsegregation/ (visited Oct 18, 2014).
195 See id. See also Interview with John Schultz, Superintendent of Hopkins;
Interview with Melissa Krull, Superintendent of Eden Prairie; Paul Grossel, Number of
Eden Prairie Students Leaving to Minnetonka Not Known Until March, Eden Prairie
News (Jan 21, 2011).
196 See, for example, Katherine Kersten, A Bad Idea Goes Round and Round (Star
Tribune Nov 13, 2010), online at http://www.startribune.com/opinion/107585253.html
(visited Oct 18, 2014); Myron Orfield, Myron Orfield: Eden Prairie Plan Healthy,
Thoughtful
(Star
Tribune
Nov
18,
2010),
online
at
http://www.
startribune.com/opinion/109027574.html (visited Oct 18, 2014); Kelly Smith, Eden
PrairieParents Turn up Heat in School Battle (Star Tribune Jan 25, 2011), online at
http://www.startribune.com/local/west/114616324.html (visited Oct 18, 2014); Jon
Tevlin, Busing Fight Feels like Lots of Drama on a Smallish Stage (Star Tribue Jan 29,
2011), online at http://www.startribune.com/local/west/114868869.html (visited Oct 18,
2014). See also, Beth Hawkins, Eden Prairie School Board to Grapple with Contentious
Boundary Plan Tonight (MinnPost Nov 23, 2010), online at http://www.minnpost.
com/learning-curve/20 10/11/eden-prairie-school-board-grapple-contentious-boundaryplan-tonight (visited Oct 18, 2014).
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between Minnetonka and the surrounding districts and within
the surrounding districts. 197 That this conduct-observed,
sanctioned, and rewarded by state law-increased racial
segregation within and between districts was both understood
and clearly foreseeable.
One could argue that by clear state action, Minnesota has
created an open enrollment system that allows Minnetonka to
refuse to admit low-income children seeking to open enroll from
Minneapolis in its system, while at the same time it officially
sanctioned and rewarded Minnetonka's segregative conduct in
recruiting white children from racially integrated schools in
nearby districts. In officially and perhaps improperly exempting
Minnetonka segregative actions from state and federal civil
rights law, and by rewarding its conduct with increased state
aid payment has the state of Minnesota intentionally caused
segregation in one district? Furthermore, have those actions in
turn directly caused racial segregation in: the 1) Eden Prairie; 2)
St Louis Park; and the 3) Hopkins school districts and 4) every
other school district in the metropolitan area?
VIII. ARE MINNESOTA'S CHARTER AND OPEN ENROLLMENT
PROGRAMS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

Charter school advocates argue that racial segregation in
charter schools is not de jure segregation prohibited by Brown.
Charter segregation is a matter of "choice," not discrimination,
writes director of the Center for School Change at Macalester
College Joe Nathan:
People choosing of their own free will to attend a public
school is the exercise of liberty. The right to assemble and
exercising freedom of choice is guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights. How then is choosing which charter school to
attend not consistent with the right of assembly? Unlike
imposed segregation, charter schools include all who
apply or wish to come. Unlike segregated schools of the
1950's and 1960's, these schools most certainly do not
exclude anyone because of their race or color of skin. 198

See Kaczke, Study: Open Enrollment Causing Segregation (cited in note 194).
198 Bill Wilson and Joe Nathan, Giving Parents Choice Among Various Schools is the
OPPOSITE of Forced Segregation (Charter Notebook Feb 8, 2012), online at
197
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In some ways, the position of the modern charter movement
with regard to racial integration is not unlike the view
199 which
expressed by the Supreme Court in Plessy v Ferguson,
we must remember did not itself forbid racial integration but
only allowed the states to do so. "If the two races are to meet
upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural
affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a
voluntary consent of individuals." 2 00 In other words, integration
if it occurs must be based on the choices of both races to be
integrated.
Brown forbids Jim Crow segregation, but cases after Swann
and Keyes also permitted a finding of intentional segregation
based on gerrymandering school boundaries, school construction
and additional policies with segregative effects, school transfer
policies with racially disparate impacts, systematically unequal
facilities, curriculum and extra-curricular
policies, and
segregative faculty assignments. The fact that segregation was a
reasonably foreseeable outcome was a relevant part of the
finding of discrimination.
Most constitutionally problematic are the white-flight
charter schools that appear in racially diverse school attendance
areas and often grow rapidly when the school district attempts
to integrate its schools. These are not "segregation academies"
prohibited by Griffin, because they do not forbid non-white
students from attending. 201
Nathan is correct that these schools do not announce
segregation as a goal, with all the implications of non-white
inferiority. Theoretically, non-white children are welcome,
should they choose such a school. Yet, in many parts of the
country, these white charter schools use an interview process,
require parental volunteering, and undertake other discipline or
screening processes that appears to have the disparate impact of
keeping non-white students out. 2 02
When these less overtly discriminatory screening processes
have sharply disparate racial impacts, the state has an
http: //www.charternotebook.org/giving-parents-choice-among-various-schools-i/
(visited
Oct 18, 2014).
199 163 US 537
(1896).
200 Id at
551.
201
See Wilson and Nathan, Giving Parents Choice, Charter Notebook (cited in note
198).
202
See Update of 'FailedPromises"at *38 (cited in note 156).
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obligation to investigate and through testing make sure that
discrimination is not taking place. To do otherwise is to allow a
practice that will have a clearly foreseeable segregative effect to
go forward.
Recently, the Department of Education Office for Civil
Rights issues a guidance document which declared, "Charter
schools located in a district subject to a desegregation plan
(whether the plan is court ordered, or required by a Federal or
State administrative entity) must be operated in a manner
consistent with that desegregation plan."2 03 It is illegal to allow
a separate state-supported public school or school district to
interfere with or undermine in any way the efforts of a school
district or state to integrate a dual school system. 2 04 At least two
courts have held that charter schools cannot operate in a
manner that would interfere with an existing school
desegregation plan. 20 5 These rules are clearest when there is a
court ordered integration remedy, 206 but should they be less
clear when the district has decided voluntarily to be integrated
or when the schools are racially integrated based on residential
integration?

The court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v
Seattle School District No. 1207 stated that diversity and
avoiding racial isolation remain a compelling governmental
interest that an elected school board may pursue absent a
finding of intention discrimination. 2 08 Can the state interfere
with the districts effort to do this without a finding of
discrimination?
Justice Kennedy seems to find an administrative
determination of the need for a desegregation plan enough to
prohibit interference. 209 Yet what if the school district has itself
203 US Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights,
Guidance Letter on Charter
Schools 3-4 (May 14, 2014), online at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201405-charter.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
204
See Wright, 407 US at 470.

See Berry v School District of Benton Harbor, 56 F Supp 2d 866, 870-72 (WD
Mich 1999); Beaufort County Board of Education u Lighthouse Charter School
201

Committee, 516 SE2d 655, 659 (SC 1999).
206

See generally Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75

Tulane L Rev 563 (2001).
207 551 US 701 (2007).
208 Parents Involved, 551
US at 783.
209

(2014).

See generally Schuette u Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S Ct 1623
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made a finding that it needs to undertake its plan to avoid a
constitutional violation or that its previous system was dual and
its action was a necessary remedial step? What sort of deference
would be due the locality's determination? Surely there is an
interest in local district pro-active action to avoid litigation.
Moreover, since Milliken, the Supreme Court seems to place at
least some value in local control over these issues. 210 Perhaps
the court's holdings in employment discrimination cases might
provide some guidance here. 2 11
What about the creation of single-race, non-white schools,
rooted in the argument that racial homogeneity may provide
desperately needed security, racial confidence, and freedom from
discrimination for low incomes non-white students? While it is
hard to find credible defenders of the white flight charters,
leaders of non-white charter schools frequently make
impassioned arguments that single race academic environments
are necessary to close the achievement gap. Here, potential
victims of discrimination-like the leaders of the all-black
schools prohibited by the Supreme Court in Columbus and
Dayton, Ohio-sometimes become proponents of segregation,
arguing that single-race schools benefit the achievement of nonwhite children.
Such leaders can be compelling both to non-white citizens,
but are often also greatly celebrated by conservative defenders
of white segregated schools and neighborhoods. Together white
and non-white proponents of segregated education can be more
than a match for civil rights advocates who, in any case, often
operate with little public support. Let's
examine
these
arguments in light of what we know of the Twin Cities context.
In the Twin Cities, there are several non-white charters that
beat the odds and have quite good test scores. But a clear
majority of the single race non-white charters have very low test
scores and are among the region's very worst schools. A
disproportionate share of the schools experiencing corruption
problems are single-race non-white, high poverty charter
schools.
While these single race schools are growing fast, can we
really say that non-white students are choosing racial
But see ParentsInvolved, 551 US 746-49 (2007) (striking down the desegregation
plan created by local elected officials).
210

211

See generally Ricci u DeStefano, 557 US 557 (2009).
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segregation as best for their children? Often, the only other
choice is a traditional school with similar demographics or a
non-white multi-racial, mostly-poor school with poor academic
performance. In this type of situation, are non-white charter
students really "choosing" segregation or simply preferring one
sort of segregation over another? If the surrounding
neighborhood schools are all non-white and poor, it is hard to
argue the creation of single race non-white charter is a
problematic as the white flight charters surrounded by racially
diverse schools.
Yet one difference is that the single race schools are being
consciously created. If we accept the principle that an all-black
school or all-Hmong school is a good idea based on solidarity and
freedom of association, how can we counter the creation of allwhite schools based on the same arguments without running
afoul of Bakke? Certainly, the German-American students at the
Twin Cities German Immersion Academy charter school in St.
Paul (which is 95 percent white) would argue that spending time
on their unique culture and language heritage strengthens their
sense of self and improves their confidence and ability to learn.
How do we say that all-black or all-Hmong schools are
permissible but that the all-white charter school is not?
In the end, both the white flight academies and ethically
themed schools place the burden of integration of the victims of
discrimination and their families. As Green outlined, the
potential for school practices that discourage integration and the
likely differences in wealth and educational attainment that
operated in the post-Brown Virginia remain present in the
racially and socially stratified world of urban and suburban
schools.212
How many low-income black or Latino children will choose
to spend their days at the German Immersion charter, totally
dominated by affluent white students, where they will be
instructed in German and concentrate their studies on German
history, art, and culture, just in order to attend an integrated
facility? Similarly, how many middle-income whites will chose to
attend the all-black Higher Ground Academy, which
concentrates on basic skills and empowerment for low-income

212

See Green, 391 US at 435-36.
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African-Americans? Clearly, both types of schools will inevitably
be segregated.
If charter schools most often reflect the racial composition of
their neighborhoods, why shouldn't they be held to the same
standards as newly created public schools? Under Swann and
Keyes, when the public school system opened or added capacity
to a school building in way that contributed to segregation, the
Court declared this to be evidence of intentional
discrimination. 2 13 It is very hard to say that charter schools
whose location and or thematic decisions create foreseeably
segregated schools are not equally constitutionally suspect.
When foreseeably segregated charter schools are sponsored or
approved by the another entity or district and they draw
children into schools more segregated than those in their home
district, this is evidence of an intra-district violation, requiring
an interdistrict remedy. If such schools are state-sponsored and
approved, they would be in addition evidence of a state-level
violation.
In term of the issue of open enrollment, the Supreme Court
in Keyes v Denver School District No 1,214 Dayton Board of
Education v Brinkman215 and Columbus Board of Education v
Penick216 declared the state-sanctioned transfer policies that
systematically and foreseeably increase racial segregation in a
district's schools or between school districts can support a
finding of discrimination. 217 In Missouri v Jenkins,218 Justice
O'Connor found that when suburban "districts 'arrang[e] for
white students residing in [urban] districts to attend [suburban]
schools"' that "MillikenI... permits interdistrict remedies." 219
Minnesota's open enrollment system has clear disparate
impacts. Whites use it more often to leave integrated schools
that to attend them. White students are more likely to have
parents with cars that can drive them to different school
See
413
443
429
See

Swann, 402 US at 20-21; Keyes, 413 US at 202.
US at 212-14.
215
US at 540-42.
216
US at 465-68.
217
Keyes, 413 US at 235 (Powell, J., concurring). The failure to adhere to a
district's approved integration plan is also a factor that may result in a finding of
intentional segregation; Gary Orfield, Must We Bus?: Segregated Schools and National
Policy 20 Table 1-1 (Brookings 1978).
218
515 US 70 (1995).
219 Id at
110.
213
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430

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2014

districts. Whites are more likely to have social networks
informing them of the availability and quality of these whiter
districts. Whites are more likely to feel comfortable moving to
attend whiter school areas. It is clearly foreseeable that open
enrollment will continue to increase racial segregation. Thus in
this sense, Minnesota's open enrollment system "arranges for"
white students residing in a segregated city district to attend
schools in whiter suburban districts and "arranges for" black
students in integrated districts to attend segregated city schools
and thus runs afoul of the Constitution.

IX. CONCLUSION
School choice programs in Minnesota have grown rapidly
and spread to other states, despite the fact that they have met
few of their original goals. Charter schools in Minnesota from
their outset have underperformed their traditional counterparts
and, by drawing enrollment and state funding from these
schools, made the public school system weaker than it has ever
been. Many charter schools are intentionally or at least
foreseeably segregated, and have also encouraged traditional
school districts to pursue more segregative policies than they
otherwise would have. Public school districts have sought
exemptions from civil rights rules to create predominantly nonwhite schools (which are oftentimes low-performing) to compete
for market share with intentionally segregated charters.
Moreover, the emergence of all-white charter schoolsessentially white flight academies-has put pressure on the
public schools to create special-themed, predominantly white
schools to keep white students in the traditional system.
Virtually all of the choice-based rationales now used by charter
advocates were once used by segregationist to avoid the
requirements of Brown. Similarly, while Minnesota's Open
Enrollment program facilitates a great deal of student
movement from one district to another, it has also contributed to
growing inter- and intra-district segregation in the state's
schools, especially in the Twin Cities.
Both choice programs have failed to meet two of the most
prominent objectives espoused by their original supportersmore racially integrated schools and elimination of the
achievement gap. At the same time, they have done nothing to
meet the requirements of several Supreme Court decisions
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regarding racial fairness in public schools. This is especially true
of the charter school system. Many charter proponents openly
support the creation of intentionally segregated charter schools.
In short, choice programs in Minnesota have evolved to the point
where constitutional remedies are both possible and necessary
to return the programs to their original goals.

